If the fundamental problem of mathematics is to decide when two things are the same, then the fundamental problem of group theory is to decide when two groups are isomorphic. This problem was first stated, for finitely presented groups, by Tietze [1908], and proved unsolvable by Adian and Rabin 50 years later. Using their result, Markov [1958] proved the unsolvability of the fundamental problem of topology; the homeomorphism problem. Of course, combinatorial group theory and topology grew up together, and their connection via the fundamental group was well known; the bridge between them and logic is the word problem for groups, proved unsolvable by Novikov in 1955.
to define equivalence of words, and developed fully in Magnus, Karrass and Solitar [1966] . (Magnus credits the idea to Dehn.) Generators are letters a v a 2 , .. . , and each generator a t has a formal inverse af~ l , also regarded as a generator. A word is a sequence of 1 • • • a£ of generators, where each e, = ±1. The empty word is denoted by 1. If w and v are words then uv denotes the concatenation of u and v-the sequence which results when u is followed by v.
A pair (a l9 a l9 . . . ; r l9 r 2 , . . . >, the first member of which is a set of generators, and the second member of which is a set of words (called relators in this context), is called a,presentation.
We determine a group G from a presentation, and by abuse of language write G = ( replace uv by urjV 9 or their inverses. We also say that the equation w x = w 2 is a consequence of the relations A) = 1 in this case.
(b) The elements of G are the equivalence classes of words. The equivalence class of w is denoted by [w] , but we often allow w to stand for [w] , (just as in ordinary mathematics we speak of the "rational number |" when we really mean the equivalence class {\ 9 \ 9 f, . . . }).
(c) The product of \u\ [v] is [wt>] . . It is now easy to prove that G is indeed a group. The only step not completely routine is to show that the product is well defined. Here one has to observe that transformations which change, say, u into another representative u' will likewise change uv into u'v 9 hence the product is independent of the choice of representatives.
If the sets {a f } and (A)} are finite in some presentation of G then G is said to be finitely presented. Given a fixed finite presentation of G, its word problem is the problem of deciding, for any word w, whether w = 1 in G. The problem of deciding whether two words w, v are equal of course reduces to this, namely, ask whether uv~l = 1. We state the word problem only for finitely presented groups, since this is the interesting case, and anyway it is not clear what it means to be "given" an infinitely presented group.
The isomorphism problem for finitely presented groups is the problem of deciding, for any two finite presentations, whether they represent isomorphic groups.
2. Origins of the word problem. Combinatorial group theory emerged from complex function theory and topology in the 1880's, with the work of Klein, Fricke and Poincaré (see Stillwell [1980] or Magnus and Chandler (to appear) ). Poincaré [1892 Poincaré [ , 1895 introduced the fundamental group to solve problems in topology, but quickly realized that it was a two-edged sword; as much as group theory made topology easier, so too did topology make group theory harder, by extending its range of application to problems of unprecedented difficulty.
The problem which led to the first statement of the word problem, by Dehn [1910] , is that of deciding when two knots are the same. Leaving aside a few subtleties such as right-and left-handedness, this is essentially a homeomorphism problem, namely: given two knots K x and K 2 in R 3 , decide whether the knot complements R 3 -K x and R 3 -K 2 are homeomorphic. Assuming that the knots K x and K 2 are polygonal, this is by any reasonable standards a question about finite objects (e.g., replacing R 3 by a cube and drilling out a tubular neighbourhood of the knot, one can subdivide the knot complement into finitely many tetrahedra). Thus for the first time, it would seem, mathematicians found themselves unable to decide in general when two finite objects were the same.
Dehn was led to the word problem by considering the special case of deciding whether a given knot K is trivial. He discovered the remarkable result that this is so if and only if the fundamental group ^(R 3 -K) is abelian (in which case it is obviously infinite cyclic), and this in turn can be decided from a solution to the word problem for TT^R 3 -AT). Dehn's argument for the latter step involves a little more topology, but in fact it is an obvious consequence: a group with generators a v . . ., a n is abelian if and only if each a i9 dj commute, and this can be decided by using the solution of the word problem to check whether the finitely many words a i a j a^xaj~x all equal 1.
It was already known, implicitly in Poincaré [1895] and explicitly in Tietze [1908] , that a topological space which is finitely presented in terms of cells (vertices, edges, faces, etc.) has a finitely presented fundamental group, so one is led to expect difficulties with finitely presented groups, because of the extent to which they reflect difficult topological problems. Tietze expressed pessimism about the isomorphism problem in his 1908 paper. Dehn extended this pessimism to the seemingly more elementary level of the word problem, but of course neither of them knew then that unsolvability could be formalized or proved to exist.
3. Positive solutions of the word problem. When Dehn stated the word problem in 1910 he was able to point to a special case where the solution was well known: the fundamental groups TT X (S) of closed orientable surfaces S. The geometric interpretation of TT X (S), in which generators are closed cuts which reduce S to a polygon and the defining relator is the sequence of edges in the polygon boundary, reduces the word problem to a topological problem which had been solved 30 years earlier. This problem is to decide whether a given closed path w (represented by a word on the generators) contracts to a point on S, and it is solved by constructing the universal covering surface S, by pasting copies of the polygon for S together (due to Schwarz in 1882, see Klein [1882] ). Then w "lifts" to a path w on S described by the same edge sequence, and w is contractible on S if and only if w is closed.
Dehn's contribution was to realise that the pattern of edges in S formed a diagram of TT^S) whose properties implied a, purely algebraic algorithm for the word problem. Thus one is spared the actual construction of S> which is very difficult for an S of genus > 1, and one can operate directly on the word w. Dehn's algorithm is to repeatedly shorten w by cancellation of terms a ê a t~x or a t~ x a t and replacement of subwords which are more than half the defining relator by their shorter complements (viewing the relator as a circular word); w = 1 if and only if w can be reduced to 1 by this process.
In general, the word problem for the fundamental group TT,(C) of any finite complex C could be solved by constructing the universal covering C of C and tracing the path w in C corresponding to the word w. However, C is very hard to find even when C is a knot complement. Dehn solved the word problem only for the trefoil knot group, though he was able to make a wonderful application of this result, proving that the right and left trefoil knots are distinct in Dehn [1914] . Another beautiful example of a geometrically motivated word problem with an unexpected algebraic solution is that for braid groups, in Artin [1926] .
However, these examples fill a very small space in the panorama of finitely presented groups. The first solution of the word problem for a really broad class of groups was that for one-relator groups by Magnus [1932] . The proof is difficult, and it has not been essentially simplified or varied since Magnus found it. Furthermore, no other solutions of comparable generality have been found since 1932, though there has been progress with groups of topological interest. In particular, Waldhausen [1968] solved the word problem for all knot groups.
4. Free groups. The group with n generators and no relators, F n = (a v . . . , a n ;-)
is called the free group of rank n. We say that a v . . ., a n freely generate F n , or form a basis for F n , because they are subject to no relations other than those true in any group, namely a t a~x = a t~x a t = 1. An example of a generating set for F n which is not a basis is {a l9 . . . , a n9 a x a 2 }, in which the last generator is the product of the first two. Rank is meaningful because any basis for F n has n elements, as can be seen by taking the abelian quotient of F n which results from the relations a,a y = a^ and appealing to the well-known invariance of rank for abelian groups. The word problem for F n is solved by the process of free reduction. Given a word w, one repeatedly cancels subwords of the form a t a[~x or af x a t until none remain. The resulting word is unique and called freely reduced. Then w = 1 if and only if its freely reduced form is empty.
Nielsen [1921] gave a process for reducing any set {u v . . ., u m } of words in F n to a basis for the subgroup they generate, showing in particular that the subgroup is free and also giving an algorithm which decides whether a given word w belongs to it. We shall not need the Nielsen process, but we do use one example where this type of result can be proved using free reduction. 5. Computability theory in the 1930's. In his celebrated paper on the incompleteness of Principia Mathematica and related systems, Gödel [1931] showed that the symbol manipulations of formal logic could be simulated by functions on the natural numbers which he called "rekursiv". These are functions built from very simple, and obviously computable, functions such as constants and successor by equations which define new values in terms of values previously obtained. For example, from the successor function s one can define + by the equations
then X from the equations xX0 = 0,
and so on. The possibility that any computable function might be obtainable by recursions did not occur to Gödel, though his paper provides evidence for this hypothesis in showing that operations not apparently related to recursion, namely the symbol manipulations of logic, are in fact so definable.
Independently of Gödel, Church was lecturing at Princeton in 1931 on his own system for defining functions, called the X-calculus. The system was intended to clarify the meaning of variables, not computation, but when news of the "rekursiv" functions arrived, Church set his Ph.D. student Kleene the task of finding which functions were X-definable. Kleene relates, in Crossley [1974] and Kleene [1979] , that he got stuck almost immediately on the predecessor function: /(O) = 0, f(s(x)) = x. The solution came to him in a dentist's office while waiting to have two wisdom teeth pulled, and after this breakthrough he needed only 5 or 6 months to X-define all the computable functions he and Church could think of.
By 1933, Church was convinced that X-definability was an exact equivalent of the intuitive notion of computability, and proposed making it the definition. This proposal is now known as Church's thesis. Gödel came to the Institute of Advanced Study in 1933, but did not accept Church's thesis at first, proposing instead a more precise formulation of his notion of "rekursiv", called "general recursive".
In 1936 the notions of X-def inability and general recursiveness were proved to coincide, but by that time Gödel had been convinced of the correctness of Church's thesis by the Turing machine concept of computability, introduced by Turing [1936] .
Turing arrives at his concept by stripping inessentials from the process of computation as experienced by a human being. All that really matter are the eye which scans and recognises symbols, the hand which writes, and the mental states which direct the actions of eye and hand. Assuming that sufficiently similar symbols or mental states will not be distinguished, Turing concludes that computation requires only finitely many mental states and a finite alphabet of symbols. Further, we can place the symbols in individual cells and scan only one cell at a time, because de facto scanning of larger sets of cells is always obtainable by "remembering" (by mental state) a finite number of previously scanned symbols and their positions. Similarly, scanning movements can be broken down into steps from cell to adjacent cell. Finally, we can take the cells to be squares on an infinite strip of tape, since any higher-dimensional array of cells can only be traversed by coordinatising the cells in some computable way, and these coordinates can equally well be assigned to cells on the infinite tape.
In short, a computation is determined by a finite set of symbols {S 0 , S i9 ... , S m ], a finite set of internal ("mental") states {# 0 , q x > . . . , q n } and a response function f(q t , Sj) which gives the action to be performed when the internal state is q ( and the scanned symbol is Sj. The only possible responses are of the forms:
Replace Sj by 6y, and go into state q v .
Move one cell to right and go into state q t >.
Move one call to left and go into state q r .
Halt. The distillation of the Turing machine concept from intuitive notions made it extremely plausible that the idea of computation had been completely captured, but other evidence was also available. First, equivalence with general recursiveness and A-definability could be proved. Second, an independent discovery of the Turing machine concept was made by Post [1936] .
Since 1936, Church's thesis has been accepted and used in the following way to prove unsolvability results. A problem P is given which consists of infinitely many questions Q t . Solution of P is viewed as the computation of a function ƒ YES if the answer to Q, is YES, A 8/) -| NO tf the answer to Q t is NO.
Next one shows that no such function ƒ is computable by Turing machine, i.e. that P is unsolvable by Turing machine. Church's thesis then implies that P is absolutely unsolvable.
The first such applications of Church's thesis were in areas closest to its origin: formal logic, formal number theory and the theory of Turing machines. But as early as 1936 Church speculated (see Kleene [1979] ) that problems not obviously related to computation might be proved unsolvable, and in 1938 (review in the Journal of Symbolic Logic, p. 74) he explicitly stated the knot problem and the word problem for groups as candidates.
Turing machines. Following Turing [1936],
we reduce the various possible responses of a machine to a given situation (q i9 Sj) = (internal state, scanned symbol) to just two types:
(i) change Sj to S f9 move one cell to right, and go into state q v \ or (ii) change Sj to S f9 move one cell to left, and go into state q r . Of course, moving without changing the symbol is included by the possibility Sj = S /9 and changing the symbol without moving is the end result of suitable moves to right and left in succession. If no response is specified for a pair (q i9 Sj), then the machine is understood to halt when it reaches this situation.
The response function f(q i9 Sj) 9 which completely determines a machine M, can then be viewed as a finite list of quintuples q t SjSfDq if9 where q t Sj is the situation, S f the symbol which replaces S j9 D = R or L is the direction of movement, and q v the new internal state. The behaviour of M is completely determined by its input (the expression initially on the tape, with the scanned symbol distinguished) and the initial state, provided we assume that there is a unique response to each situation (q i9 Sj) 9 i.e. that q t Sj begins at most one quintuple.
To give a simple example, the following machine
when placed anywhere on a block of l's, will travel to the right hand end, insert a 1 in the first blank cell, Q then halt. This formulation of Turing machines assumes that the tape is infinite in both directions, so that the machine can always move left or right with no danger of falling off. We now give a numerical formulation of Turing machines, evolved from Minsky [1961] and Cohen and Aanderaa [1980] , which provides additional tape out of sheer nothing.
At any instant the future of M's computation is determined by the tape expression, scanned cell and internal state, which we can identify with the following word, called the complete state: 
and hence transforms the complete state pair 
where A t = S kx q t , B t = S p C t = q r , D t = S f S ki , and the ^-transformations similarly in the form
When convenient, we shall identify a machine M with the corresponding set of /-and /--transformations, taking {/} and {r} as disjoint sets of indices. Later we shall see that these transformations are very easy to simulate in finitely presented groups.
7. Unsolvability. To contemplate using a Turing machine to answer questions about other machines we first need a fixed finite alphabet in which to write a description, r M 1 , of each machine M. This is because a Turing machine S can respond to only finitely many symbols, hence it cannot even read a question about an arbitrary M unless the symbols of the question are mentioned in its quintuples.
Without loss of generality we can assume that all machines work on finite subsets of the alphabet (Q 1, T, 1", . . . }, so that if we denote states by q, q', q'\ ... all quintuples can be written in the alphabet {#> q\ 4"> --• > Q 1> 1' » • • • y ^ ^}> which we can reduce to the finite alphabet {q, Q 1, ', R 9 L} by viewing ' as a whole, rather than part, symbol.
A machine is unambiguously described by concatenating its quintuples into a single word, e.g.
'J
£*,! by,l"«W.
and finally we can code back into the agreed machine alphabet by
The result of applying this process to the quintuples of a machine M will be called the standard description, r M n , of M.
We consider the type of problem about machines M which consists of questions Q M with a single parameter M. A machine S which receives input may then be deemed to have received question <2M> since any reasonable way of writing Q M will be computable from r M 1 . Likewise, there is no loss of generality in assuming that S answers "YES" by halting on 1, "NO" by halting on Q We therefore define a problem {Q M } to be solvable if there is an S which answers each question Q M (in the above sense) correctly.
An unsolvable problem is now easily obtained by a little self-referential mischief; we ask the questions Q M : Does M eventually halt on • after being given input
Suppose there is a machine S which correctly answers Q M for any value of M. When M = S we get a contradiction because S interprets input r S~l as the question Q s and answers "YES" by halting on 1, in which case the true answer to Q s is "NO"; S answers "NO" by halting on Q in which case the true answer to Q s is "YES".
Thus we have proved the unsolvability of the Special halting problem. For each Turing Machine M, decide whether M eventually halts on • after receiving input r M 1 . The unsolvability of a similar halting problem was first proved by Turing [1936] , by associating real numbers with certain machines and applying Cantor's diagonal argument. The related "self-referential" argument, which of course was used by Gödel [1931] in a different context, seems first to have been applied to Turing machines by Hermes [1961] .
The unsolvability of the special halting problem is strong enough to prove the unsolvability of the isomorphism problem, and the word problem in a general form: for any group G and word w, decide whether w = 1 in G. However, if one wants a specific G with unsolvable word problem, a specific Turing machine with unsolvable halting problem is needed. This is the universal n by suitable marks. The energetic reader is urged to fill in the details of this idea, since it is probably easier to construct a universal machine for oneself than to read any of the accounts in the literature. The less energetic reader may appeal to Church's thesis: the simulation of M on ƒ is clearly computable, hence there is a Turing machine that does it.
The coding into machine alphabet used in the previous section has the convenient property that • encodes itself, hence M eventually halts on • after receiving input This problem can obviously be rephrased as an unsolvable problem about the /-and /--transformations used in §6. However, a more convenient problem is obtained if we first modify T to a machine T' which imitates T until T halts on •, if ever, then erases the whole tape and halts in a previously unused state q 0 . T' is easily constructed by adding end markers to the alphabet of T and using them to enclose the marked portion of tape at all times (pushing them further out whenever more space is needed). When the time comes to erase the tape, T' first moves to the right end marker, then erases everything back to and including the left end marker, before halting by going into state Then if we identify T' with the corresponding set of /-and r-transformations, and if (U 7 , V f ) represents V starting on input / we have T eventually halts on • after receiving input I «=>(U I9 Vj) is convertible to (q 0 , 0) by T'.
Since the former problem is unsolvable, so is the latter.
Finally we construct a system T* by adding transformations which allow (q 0 , 0) to be converted to the simplest possible pair, (0, 0). We make these transformations of the /-type in §6, i.e. 9. Semigroups. The first success of computability theory outside logic was in the theory of semigroups. Post [1946 Post [ , 1947 proved the unsolvability of two simple semigroup problems, though he did not state them as such. The 1946 problem is generally known as the Post correspondence problem, and it can be stated as follows.
Let S n be the free semigroup on generators a x , . . ., a n and let S n X S n be the direct product. For any finite set of pairs (A t , B { ) G S n X S n , let S<( AB)) be the subsemigroup they generate, and let D denote the subsemigroup generated by (a l9 a x ) , . . . , (a n , a n ). Then the problem is to decide whether S«A,jm n D = 0.
Post's proof was the belated fruit of 20 years' work on combinatorial definitions of computability, in which he had anticipated the main results of Gödel and Church, but in a form he considered unpublishable, and arrived at the Turing machine concept at the same time as Turing (see the 1941 paper of Post in Davis [1965] ). With the correspondence problem he finally moved ahead of the field. Church then suggested that he tackle the word problem for semigroups, which can be stated as follows.
Given a finite set of equations P t = Q t between words on an alphabet {«J, . . ., a n } y and any words X, 7, decide whether X = Y is a consequence of the equations. (The notion of consequence of course differs from that defined for groups in §1 in the absence of equations a t a t~x = Ö,-" 1 **,--1.) Post [1947] proved the word problem unsolvable by using words to represent complete machine states, much as we have done in §6, and using equations to make the changes which occur with successive steps of computation. In order to have a specific word represent the halt-on-n situations, he introduces a new symbol q which is created from #,• whenever the machine has no response to this situation. Additional equations of the forms qs == q, sq = q, for all other symbols s, enable q to "eat up" the rest of the word. Then the halting problem is equivalent to deciding, for a given word w (representing the initial complete state), whether w = q in the semigroup. By writing down the equations which reflect computation by the universal machine T, one obtains a fixed, finitely presented semigroup with unsolvable word problem.
A similar proof was obtained independently by Markov [1947] . Unfortunately, Post's semigroup cannot be embedded in a group. This is obvious from the equations sq = q, which in a group would imply 5=1, and hence collapse everything to free generators q r Thus the word problem for groups remained open.
Turing first heard about the word problem for groups in the late 1940's (see Crossley [1974, p. 54] ), became absorbed in it, and after about 10 days' work announced a proof that it was unsolvable. By the time he was due to deliver his proof in a seminar, he had discovered a mistake, but he still managed to prove unsolvability for semigroups with cancellation. In a semigroup with cancellation one can derive A = B from XA = XB or AX = BX for any word X, though this still does not imply that the semigroup can be embedded in a group. Nevertheless, Turing's result (Turing [1950] ) was a big advance, and some of his ideas were crucial in the later proofs for groups.
For example, Turing prevents the semigroup from collapsing under cancellation by the use of record symbols. Instead of replacing the part P t of the complete state by Q i9 one replaces it by a^T,, where a" T, are symbols which "record" the fact that the ith equation is being used. This protects q from being cancelled in case P t = sq, Q t = q, though of course new relations are needed to ultimately remove the record symbols, and this creates other problems. Turing could overcome these problems for cancellation semigroups, but not for groups.
Groups.
Just as the word problem for semigroups followed the Post correspondence problem, the word problem for groups was not settled until unsolvability had first been proved for something more complicated. In 1951 Boone proved the unsolvability of what he called the quasi-Magnus problem for a finitely presented group G: to decide, given a subset {a v . . ., a e ] of the generators of G and any word w, whether w is equal to a word on {#!,..., a e ) with positive exponents. (The corresponding problem for arbitrary exponents, in other words, deciding whether w is in the subgroup generated by {a v . . ., a e }, is known as the Magnus problem. It was solved for one-relator groups by Magnus [1932] .)
A Magnus-type problem arises naturally when one attempts to simulate a Turing machine by equations in a group, using record symbols to prevent unwanted cancellations. Record symbols accumulate as the computation proceeds, so a computation leading to halt-on-n cannot be identified by a specific final word, but rather a specific subword in.an unpredictable mess of record symbols. Thus the question equivalent to the halting problem is whether a given word equals a word of a certain form on a certain subset of the generators. Boone's result was contained in his 1952 Princeton dissertation, supervised by Church, and published in Boone [1954a,b, 1955a,b] . In 1956 Boone succeeded in modifying his construction so that record symbols could be removed at the end of the computation, thus obtaining a proof of the unsolvability of the word problem.
In the meantime, Novikov had published his unsolvability proof in 1955 (though Boone's work was independent of this). Novikov takes Turing's semigroup with cancellation as his starting point, but he and Boone use similar devices for controlling the movement of symbols. For example, both use commuting relations kS t = S f k which allow /c's to "filter through" words on {£,}, and quasi-commuting relations xS É = S f x 2 which allow unlimited rightward movement of x 9 s through words on {S,}, but restrict leftward movement, since each time a power of x moves left across an S f , its exponent is halved. It turns out, ultimately, that only these types of relation are needed, together with Turing-style use of record symbols (see § §13 and 14).
Novikov and Boone proved all results about relations in their groups by long combinatorial arguments from first principles. Little by little, people noticed that their combinatorial lemmas could be proved by known arguments from group theory, using in particular the free product with amalgamation of Schreier [1927] Actually, a stronger result is needed for applications to the word problem, and to motivate it we consider a normal form for elements in an HNN extension.
A typical word in//= Gu<^;{r^ = <K&)\b G B}} looks like To make this process precise (though not necessarily computable), we chose specific coset representatives; g B of the coset Bg 9 g c of the coset Cg 9 with 1 as the representative of both B and C Then we work from right to left as follows.
If e k = -1 we factorize g k into B k g* 9 where B k G B 9 so
Similarly, if e k = + 1 we factorize g k into Qg^c, where Q G C, and '*g* = tC k g£ = *-! (Q)r gj f = «^(C^fif.
(Since <f > is an isomorphism, <j>~x is well defined.) We now have either g k _ l <j>(B k ) or gfc-i^'^Q) between t* k~x and / e *. We factorize it similarly, according to the sign of e k _ l9 and continue passing elements of B or C to the left, leaving coset representatives behind. If at any stage t and t~x appear with only 1 between them, they are cancelled. The final result is a word of the form where (i) g' 0 is an arbitrary element of G,
(ii) 8 f . = -1 => g/ is a coset representative of G mod B, (iii) £, = + 1 =» g/ is a coset representative of G mod C, (iv) f, f "* do not occur as consecutive letters. This word is still not unique, because g/ can be any word from the equivalence class [gj] The mapping ® h is defined to be "multiply on the left and reduce to normal form, one letter of h at a time". Then (i)-(iii) are clear, but since the word for an element h G H is not unique, the problem is to show that 0 A is well defined. This requires showing that equivalent words determine the same permutation, in other words, that each defining relator of H determines the identity permutation. For a relator g of G this is clear, because
since g = 1 in G. (Although we are supposed to apply g one letter at a time, it is clear that these letters just accumulate to the left of g' 0 , since no interaction with t is possible. We shall similarly present just the end results of letter-byletter accumulations below.) The relators involving t are tt~\ t~~lt and t~lbt^(by l .
We check just the last of these, since the first two are similar, but easier. In case (b) we continue with PROOF. Consider the t t of highest index in w, then view w as a word in H t . Since H t is an HNN extension of //,_! with stable letter t i9 the conclusion is immediate by Corollary 2.
• The embedding G^ H and Britton's lemma were first proved using the theory of free products with amalgamation, based on a similar technique of permuting normal forms developed by Van der Waerden [1948] and B. H. Neumann [1954] , The latter paper also contains a direct proof of G*-* H, attributed to Philip Hall, which uses permutations and coset representatives, but not normal forms. The direct application of permutations and normal forms to HNN theory is due to Schupp [1974] .
13. A group with unsolvable Magnus problem. We begin with the free group of rank 3 F= (x 9 y,z;-) and encode natural number pairs (i 9 j) by the elements
We want to reflect the /-and r-transformations, used to represent Turing machines in §6, by isomorphisms <j> h <f > r in F which act appropriately on the corresponding/^/,/). Since an /-transformation sends
we want <f y to send It is clear that if (U 9 V) 9 {U' 9 V') 9 {U" 9 V"\ ... is a sequence of complete state pairs which result from successive steps of computation by T* 9 then p(U' 9 V), p(U" 9 V"\ ... can be produced from p(U 9 V) by <J>, and <k isomorphisms, and hence by conjugations with //s and f/s. To this extent H(T*) reflects computation in T* (with the f/s and f/s serving as "record symbols"), but we have to show that H(T*) does not also allow "fake" computations which have no counterpart in T*. The following lemmas will guarantee this. whereas there is at most one quintuple beginning with q t Sj.
• The encoding of complete states by numbers makes Lemma 1 possible. If one uses instead a more obvious representation of the complete state by a word on {q t } 9 {Sj} 9 like that in §6, and works in the group with generators {#,}, {Sj} (as Boone [1959] and Britton [1963] This is indeed an isomorphism, between the free groups with bases {£,}, q i SjS J2 and {Sj}, Sj>q r Sj, but we cannot guarantee that it is the only isomorphism which applies to the word. The free group with basis {£,}, qiSjS J2 also has basis {SJ), q i9 hence any isomorphism corresponding to a quintuple which begins with q i will also apply to it.
To overcome this problem, Boone introduces some remarkable but complicated modifications, for example a new generator x and relations xSj = SjX 2 which Britton views as an isomorphism x H> X 2 being induced by conjugation with stable letter S r In the Cohen and Aanderaa proof such isomorphisms are miraculously merged with the isomorphism p(A, B)\->p(C, D) which effects the change in the neighbourhood of the scanned symbol by dissolving the #,'s and S/s altogether, encoding their sequence by the exponents of x and y. (Actually Cohen and Aanderaa use a more complicated encoding than ours, which does not permit them to work in a free group, however the idea is the same.)
A second possible source of fake computations in H(T*) is the fact that an equation P = Q is, so to speak, bidirectional. It allows subword P to be replaced by g, or subword Q to be replaced by P, whereas only one of these directions has a computational interpretation, the other corresponding to a fake, backward, computational step. This problem already arises with semigroups, and was solved in that context by Post [1947] . To use Post's argument in our present context we introduce the halting subgroup H 0 (T*) c F c PROOF. Suppose that w is a word in <// 0 (!T*), {//}, {t r }} which equals a word ƒ on x, y 9 z. Then wf~l = 1 in H(T*) 9 so if w contains any t i the generalized Britton's lemma says it contains a subword t^afo or t^t^1 where PROOF. It will suffice to show that, for a complete state pair (U 9 V) 9 T* converts (U 9 V) to (0, 0) *>p(U 9 V) G <z, {t t } 9 {t r }) 9 since the left-hand side is unsolvable by Theorem 1, and the right-hand side is decided by a solution to the Magnus problem for H(T*).
(=>). If /-and r-transformations in T* convert ( U 9 V) to (0, 0), then p{U 9 V) is converted top(0 9 0) by the corresponding isomorphisms </ >/ and <f> r , and hence by a series of conjugations by //s and * r 's. That is,
W~
x p{ U 9 V)W = p(0 9 0) = z for some word W on {*,},{ t r ).
we have, a fortiori, p(U 9 V) G <// 0 (r*), {t t } 9 {t r }} 9 and hence by Lemma 3, p(U 9 V) G ^o(^)-Then, by definition of H 0 (T*) 9 T* converts (U 9 V) to (0,0).
• 14. Unsolvability of the word problem and isomorphism problem. It is now easy to construct a group with unsolvable word problem from H(T*) by a device of Boone [1959] . Namely, let
Since z \-+ z 9 {t t H> t t } 9 {t r H> t r ) is obviously an isomorphism in H(T*) 9 K(T*) is an HNN extension of H(T*) with stable letter k. THEOREM 
The word problem for K(T*) is unsolvable.
PROOF. Since k commutes with z, {*,}, {t r } 9 a word p(U 9 V) G <z, {*,}, {*,.}> satisfies kp(U, V) = p(U 9 V)k. Conversely, suppose this equation holds, in other words that kp(U 9 V)k~lp(U 9 V)~l -1. Since the only occurrences of k 9 k ~l on the left-hand side are those explicitly shown, Britton's lemma tells us immediately thatp(U 9 V) G <z, {/,}, {/ r }>.
Thus p(U 9 V) G <z, {/,}, {t r }}**kp(U 9 V)k~lp(U 9 V)~l = 1. A solution to the word problem would decide the right-hand side, hence the left-hand side, but this is impossible by the unsolvability of the Magnus problem in Theorem 3.
• The isomorphism problem was first proved unsolvable independently by Adian [1957] and Rabin [1958] . Actually these authors proved unsolvability of a large number of group-theoretic problems; the isomorphism problem is quite easily settled once one has a group with unsolvable word problem in which every element =£ 1 has infinite order, as was pointed out by Novikov [1958] .
To see that every element ^ 1 in ÂT(r*) has infinite order, observe that this is certainly true of the free group F we started with. It remains true under each successive HNN extension; elements not involving the new stable letter t retain their orders by the embedding of Corollary 1 to Theorem 2, while an element involving t is easily seen to be of infinite order by applying Britton's lemma to powers of its normal form.
THEOREM 5. The isomorphism problem is unsolvable.
PROOF. Take the group K(T*) with unsolvable word problem and no elements ^ 1 of finite order, and for each w in the generators of K(T*), which we rename a v . . . , a p9 construct the group K W (T*) -K{1+) U <{*,}; {*TH -"/}>• If w = 1 in K(T*) then each a t = 1 in ^(T*) and hence K w( T *) = <{*/};-> = free group of rank/?. If w T^ 1 in K(T*) then w is of infinite order, as is a i9 hence w H» a t is an isomorphism and K"(T*) results from K(T*) by a series of HNN extensions. In particular, K(T*)<^> /^(T*) by Corollary 1 to Theorem 2, and hence KyviT*) has unsolvable word problem, which means it is not free of rank/?. (Suppose on the contrary that there are free generators x" . . ., x p for KJ^T*), and take a fixed set of words a t (Xj) 9 k t (xj) which express the original generators of ^(T*) in terms of x l9 .. ., x p . Use these words to rewrite a given word W in terms of x x , . . ., x p9 and hence decide whether W = 1 by free reduction as in §4.)
In short, w = 1 in K(T*) <=» A^(r*) = free group of rank/?, and we have reduced the word problem for K(T*) to a special case of the isomorphism problem; the latter problem is therefore unsolvable.
•
Remarks.
(1) The reduction of the word problem to a special case of the isomorphism problem might reinforce the impression that the isomorphism problem is more difficult. But don't forget that our group K(T*) is able to simulate the universal Turing machine-any question which reduces to a question of the universal machine's halting for a certain input can be reduced in turn to a question whether a certain word equals 1 in K(T*). Any isomorphism question is capable of such reduction. This follows from the theorem of Tietze [1908] that any finite presentation of a group can be converted into any other by a finite sequence of elementary transformations, now known as Tietze transformations. Given two presentations G v G 2 , a universal Turing machine can systematically apply all finite sequences of Tietze transformations to G l9 and halt if and when G 2 is obtained.
Thus the isomorphism problem can also be reduced to the word problem for K(T*) 9 and we can say that they are of the same degree of unsolvability. and a solution to the homeomorphism problem would yield a solution to the isomorphism problem, whence the homeomorphism problem is unsolvable.
(3) Suppose we let T be any Turing machine, not necessarily universal, again let T' be the modification which imitates T except that it erases the whole tape before halting on •, let T* be the corresponding set of pair transformations, and let K(T*) be the group constructed to simulate T*. Then there is a similar argument leading from the special halting problem in §7 to THEOREM 4'. The problem of deciding, for any T and w, whether w = 1 in K(T*), is unsolvable.
Theorem 5 follows equally well from Theorem 4', hence the unsolvability of the isomorphism problem and the homeomorphism problem depends only on the tiny amount of Turing machine theory needed to construct T' from T, not on a universal machine.
The universal machine is, of course, crucial in obtaining a specific group K(T*) with unsolvable word problem, and this unfortunately makes it impractical to write down a presentation of K(T*\ since all known universal machines have at least 20 quintuples (see e.g. Minsky [1967] ).
